

TREASURY INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR TAX ADMINISTRATION



Assessment of the Internal Revenue Service's Active Shooter Readiness and Training

May 15, 2023

Report Number: 2023-IE-R005

This report has cleared the Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration disclosure review process and information determined to be restricted from public release has been redacted from this document.

HIGHLIGHTS: Assessment of the Internal Revenue Service's Active Shooter Readiness and Training

Final Evaluation Report issued on May 15, 2023

Report Number 2023-IE-R005

Why TIGTA Did This Study

This review was initiated because the IRS is entrusted with providing a safe and secure environment for essential functions and assets, including the personnel and public who may occupy or conduct business at its facilities. As such, IRS leaders must prepare for emergencies, especially those that can occur without warning.

The rise in active shooter incidents across the United States and the increased hostilities directed at Federal agencies make it important for IRS leaders to develop a plan and train their staff on best practices to help keep themselves safe during an active threat situation.

Impact on Tax Administration

An active shooter or other mass casualty event at a Tax Processing Center or any IRS facility can result in significant damage to the facility and even greater physical and psychological trauma to the staff.

What TIGTA Found

The IRS has developed an active shooter training program that educates its employees on the "Run, Hide, Fight" response that aligns with the Department of Homeland Security guidelines for dealing with an active shooter situation. This training is given to IRS employees and contractors to provide comprehensive information on IRS security policies, procedures, and actions that should be taken to prepare for and respond to potential security incidents and emergencies.

While the IRS has provided employees with materials to raise awareness about Active Shooter situations, additional actions are needed to ensure that contractors are aware of security protocols. In addition to training, employees need to fully understand their response options to empower them to react decisively. For example, the IRS missed the opportunity to conduct a significant after-action assessment of a recent event, which would have helped identify shortcomings in its mass notification messaging and post-incident accounting for staff.

What TIGTA Recommended

TIGTA made five recommendations to the Chief, Facilities Management and Security Services, that included ensuring that action is taken if contractors do not timely complete security briefings, and that policies are updated to require after-action reports of active shooter drills or events to assess the efficacy of the response. Further, IRS officials need to update the annual security briefing to emphasize that employees need to discuss emergency preparedness with their managers annually. Also, IRS officials need to formally stipulate and agree on when and how AtHoc will be used to notify staff of active shooter events and how it will be used post-event to account for staff.

The IRS agreed with all our recommendations.



TREASURY INSPECTOR GENERAL
FOR TAX ADMINISTRATION

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20024

May 15, 2023

MEMORANDUM FOR: COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE

FROM: Russell P. Martin 
Deputy Inspector General for Inspections and Evaluations

SUBJECT: Final Evaluation Report – Assessment of the Internal Revenue Service’s
Active Shooter Readiness and Training (Evaluation #IE-22-016)

This report presents the results of our evaluation to determine if Internal Revenue Service (IRS) employees are trained on best practices to keep themselves safe during an active shooter/active threat situation. This review is part of our Fiscal Year 2023 Annual Program Plan and addresses the major management and performance challenge of *Protecting Taxpayer Data and IRS Resources*.

Management’s complete response to the draft report is included in Appendix III.

If you have any questions, please contact me or Kevin Riley, Director, Office of Inspections and Evaluations

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Background

The Department of Homeland Security defines an active shooter as an individual actively engaged in killing or attempting to kill people in a confined and populated area. In most cases, the active shooter uses a firearm(s), there is no pattern or method to their selection of victims, and many active shooter situations are often over within 10 to 15 minutes. Law enforcement is usually required to end an active shooter situation. Figure 1 illustrates the Department of Homeland Security's reference guide for dealing with an active shooter situation.

Figure 1: Active Shooter Pocket Reference

ACTIVE SHOOTER *Pocket Reference Card*

<p>RUN</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ Identify the location(s) of the threat ▶ Quickly escape from the threat (via windows, stairs, doors, etc.) ▶ Leave belongings behind 	<p>HIDE</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ Block entry to hiding place and lock doors ▶ Hide in area out of the shooter's view ▶ Silence mobile communication devices 	<p>FIGHT</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ Commit to decisive and aggressive action ▶ Your goal is to incapacitate the shooter ▶ Fight until the threat is neutralized
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Consider all of your options: **Run** ↻ **Hide** ↻ **Fight**

CALL OR TEXT 9-1-1 IF YOU CAN

<p>STAY SAFE!</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ Pay attention to emergency alerts ▶ Report suspicious activity and individuals ▶ Take note of the two nearest exits in any facility you visit ▶ Help others if you are able to do so safely ▶ If you are in a secure location, stay there until law enforcement enters <div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 5px; margin-top: 10px; font-size: small;"> Contact your local security POC for additional information (name, phone, email, etc.): </div>	<p>WHEN LAW ENFORCEMENT ARRIVES</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ Remain calm and follow instructions ▶ Put down any items in your hands (i.e., bags, jackets) ▶ Keep hands visible at all times ▶ Avoid quick movements toward officers such as holding on to them for safety ▶ Avoid pointing, screaming, or yelling ▶ Follow responder's instructions when evacuating
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cisa.gov/active-shooter-preparedness

Source: Department of Homeland Security.

Raising employee awareness about active shooter threats can help ensure that employees are able to react quickly to increase their chances of surviving an incident. The Interagency Security Committee (ISC)¹ has prepared guidelines to help agencies develop active shooter preparedness plans. The ISC suggests that agencies provide training, materials, and awareness discussions to inform employees on active shooter preparedness. Specifically,

- Employees shall be trained in the Federally endorsed “Run, Hide, Fight” concept.
- Employees shall be informed of the importance of having a personal plan.
- New employees shall be given active shooter preparedness training during the initial onboarding period and annually thereafter.

While the ISC provides recommended practices and matters to be considered to implement active shooter preparedness plans, the ISC recognizes that agency representatives must consider what is most appropriate for each facility and its occupants.

At the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), the Facilities Management and Security Services (FMSS) is the support services provider organization charged with providing nationwide facilities and security services. With a budget of almost \$1 billion, the FMSS manages over 26 million square feet of space at approximately 600 locations throughout the United States. The HQ Security function within the FMSS is responsible for developing the active shooter policies and training content, including the annual FMSS Physical Security Briefing, which is loaded into the Integrated Talent Management System (ITMS),² while the Field Operations function within FMSS handles overseeing the implementation and enforcement of IRS and ISC physical security concepts at the buildings within their assigned territories.

Results of Review

As recommended by the ISC, the FMSS developed an active shooter training program that educates IRS employees and contractors who work in IRS facilities on the “Run, Hide, Fight” response for dealing with an active shooter situation. The active shooter training is included in the IRS’s FMSS Physical Security Mandatory Briefing. This briefing is provided to IRS employees and contractors. The briefing provides comprehensive information on IRS security policies, procedures, and actions that should be taken to prepare for and respond to potential security incidents and emergencies. Figure 2 shows a slide from the mandatory briefing outlining the “Run, Hide, Fight” response.

¹ The ISC consists of 64 Federal departments and agencies that work to develop security policies, standards, and recommendations for nonmilitary Federal facilities in the United States.

² The ITMS is a Department of Treasury enterprise system that provides various functions, including a learning management model that delivers training content to employees and contractors.

Figure 2: Slide From IRS Active Shooter Training



Source: FMSS Physical Security Mandatory Briefing 2021 (Briefing # 31659).

However, while our review found that the IRS has provided employees with materials to educate them about active shooter situations, additional actions are needed to ensure that contractors are aware of security protocols and employees fully understand response options to help empower them to react decisively. In addition, the IRS missed the opportunity to conduct a significant after-action assessment of a recent event, which would have helped identify shortcomings in its mass notification messaging and post-incident accounting for staff.

The Majority of IRS Employees Completed the Mandatory Training on Active Shooter Preparedness, but Improvements Are Needed to Ensure That Contractors Comply With Requirements

Our review of an ITMS summary completion report provided by the IRS's Human Capital Office for the period July 1, 2021, to June 30, 2022, indicates that 78,266 (98 percent) of the 79,865 existing full-time IRS employees completed the required FMSS briefing. However, unlike IRS employees, the ITMS report shows that only 71 percent of the 9,315 contractors working at IRS facilities completed the mandatory FMSS briefing.

In discussions with IRS management, they indicated that each function is responsible for ensuring their staff completes the required briefing. The reasons for not completing the training may include instances in which staff was on extended leave or separated after the training was assigned in the ITMS.

As recommended by the ISC, the IRS requires its new employees to complete the FMSS Physical Security briefing within their first 10 days on the job. Managers are required to ensure that new employees complete the briefings as part of their onboarding process. The IRS requires that existing employees complete the FMSS Physical Security briefing annually or successfully complete an Opt-Out test that includes questions to test their existing knowledge of FMSS material including the active shooter training material. If the employee successfully passes the Opt-Out test, they do not need to review the full briefing.

Regarding the contractors, initially there was not a formalized monitoring process; however, starting in October 2022, the IRS Human Capital Office's Mandatory Briefings office will assume oversight of the Contractor Mandatory Briefings program. The FMSS's role will be to remove access to IRS buildings for contractors who are not compliant with required Security Awareness Training.

In addition to the initial training when onboarded and the annual refresher training, the IRS also uses other communications media to raise awareness about an active shooter. For instance, the IRS issued e-mail communications to its employees that referenced active shooter preparedness and other safety topics such as shelter-in-place and employee evacuation procedures. Further, the IRS also periodically holds active shooter exercises, which in some instances included first responders and/or law enforcement officers. Managers at local offices can request these exercises, which are then coordinated by FMSS Field staff, with attendance being optional. The intent of these exercises is to educate attendees about what might occur during an active shooting situation. The Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration's Office of Investigations reported conducting 62 joint active shooter sessions with FMSS Field staff during Fiscal Year 2022.

The Chief, FMSS, should:

Recommendation 1: Ensure that contractors are denied access to IRS buildings if they fail to complete the assigned FMSS Physical Security Mandatory Briefing timely.

Management's Response: The IRS agreed with this recommendation and has implemented processes to remove the access privileges of contractor employees who fail to complete training requirements timely.

Additional Actions Are Needed to Improve Response Preparedness for an Active Shooter

A recent incident at the Memphis Campus³ revealed that actions should be taken to improve IRS preparedness and readiness for an active shooter situation. Specifically, on September 8, 2022, an active shooter was reported at the Memphis Campus and local law enforcement personnel were dispatched. While the report of an active shooter ultimately turned out to be unfounded, our discussions with some managers on-site the day of the incident indicated there was a lot of confusion with opportunities for the IRS to improve its preparedness. Specifically,

³ The campuses process paper and electronic submissions, correct errors, and forward data to the Computing Centers for analysis and posting to taxpayer accounts

- Some staff did not know how to respond to the reported active shooter event.
- Employees reported not being alerted to the active shooter situation by the on-site public announcement system or AtHoc⁴ messaging system.
- After-action assessment of the response to the active shooter incident was not completed.

Managers stated some staff did not know how to respond to the reported active shooter event

Managers we interviewed stated that some employees did not recall how to respond to the active shooter situation and called their manager in a panic asking what to do. IRS internal guidelines note that an effective Occupant Emergency Plan (OEP) provides building occupants with guidance to protect themselves and others in the case of an emergency and are created to properly account for any unique features of each specific location. These guidelines stipulate that the IRS manager “must” review the OEP with their staff. It further places an expectation on all employees to:

- Familiarize themselves with the OEP for their assigned facility.
- Follow instructions during an emergency.
- Participate in drills and exercises.
- Advise their manager of their status after any drill or incident for accountability purposes.

However, guidelines are inconsistent as to the frequency with which managers and staff should hold OEP discussions, or how and to what degree these discussions should be documented. For example, guidelines for managers in the Field Assistance function – whose work requires frequent interaction with the public - are required to hold security-related discussions (among several others) quarterly and to document them on a Form 12149, *Functional Security Review for Managers*, while all other IRS managers do not have the same guidelines regarding the frequency or documentation requirements for these discussions.

We were also informed that during the Memphis incident, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

⁴ AtHoc is the IRS emergency alert notification system.

AtHoc notifications were not sent out to inform employees at the Memphis Campus of potential active shooter threat

The IRS has an electronic notification system (AtHoc) that can be used to provide real-time mass notification alerts on workplace closures due to outbreaks, weather, security issues, active shooter, building developments, or other emergency situations. The system will automatically send alerts to all employees (desktops, laptops, and mobile devices). Employee contact information is from HRConnect.⁵

During the incident at the Memphis Campus, employees reported a lot of confusion with many of them learning about the incident from coworkers as they did not hear announcements from the on-site public announcement system or receive the AtHoc notification. We subsequently learned from IRS officials that a public announcement system announcement was made; however, it is unclear if it was audible to employees in all areas of the campus. Whereas, the AtHoc mass notification messaging system was not used because of the potential unintended consequence of identifying employees who were sheltering in place. FMSS staff explained that the AtHoc system is controlled and operated by the IRS Chief of Staff through the Senior Commissioner's Representative – Continuity of Operations function. Within campus locations like Memphis, an AtHoc Site coordinator and designated back-up personnel can issue alerts via the AtHoc system. In our discussion with the Memphis AtHoc Site Coordinator, they indicated that based on discussions with the off-site manager, a decision was made to not issue an AtHoc alert during the incident because the site was supposedly in lockdown. Leadership determined that an AtHoc alert would have caused computers, laptops, or cellular phones registered within the system to emit an audible notification of the alert. This could potentially reveal the location of persons attempting to hide within the building. We were further informed that after it was determined the site was cleared and it was safe to return to normal operations, the AtHoc system was used to issue an all-clear alert several hours later so that staff would know the campus would be open the following day.

In the midst of the crisis, having to make a decision on whether or not to use AtHoc could have wasted precious time in alerting employees. While the rationale to not invoke AtHoc is understandable, the intent of the system is to rapidly notify employees of an unfolding situation so that they can evacuate or avoid unsuspectedly entering the building and getting into harm's way. As [REDACTED]

Internal guidelines do not require after-action assessments

The FMSS did not prepare an after-action assessment after the Memphis incident. While the incident ultimately turned out to be unfounded, multiple law enforcement agencies responded to the incident, with reports of an armed perpetrator near or on the premises. A complete sweep of the building was completed to confirm that there was no immediate threat to persons or property.

The FMSS manual requires that Emergency Evacuation Drills and Shelter-in-Place drills be conducted annually. Subsequent to these drills, the FMSS site security specialist is responsible

⁵ HRConnect is a Department of Treasury enterprise human resources system used to enable human resources professionals, managers, and employees to manage human resources processes.

for performing an after-action assessment of lessons learned. For example, one specific item required to be assessed is of persons with disabilities to determine if they encountered any difficulties in the employee evacuation drills or shelter-in-place drills, and if they did, what could be improved upon. This after-action assessment is further required to be documented and recorded in the FMSS *Security +* system.

A similar requirement is not articulated for active shooter drills and/or reported active shooter threats. As such, an after-action assessment of the Memphis incident was not conducted. We believe an after-action assessment of the Memphis active shooter event and evacuation could have yielded valuable information about the efficacy of the plan and its actual execution by all occupants - not only those needing additional assistance. Such an assessment could also yield information about how well the first responders communicated and coordinated their efforts. It also could have provided FMSS staff and senior managers first-hand accounts of the issues that the managers and staff in the facility faced that reportedly chaotic afternoon.

The Chief, FMSS, should:

Recommendation 2: Update the annual FMSS Physical Security Briefing to emphasize that employees need to discuss emergency preparedness with their managers annually to ensure that they are clear on evacuation routes, shelter-in-place locations, and when gathering at rally points is appropriate.

Management's Response: The IRS agreed with this recommendation. The FMSS has updated the annual FMSS Physical Security Briefing to emphasize that employees discuss emergency preparedness with their managers annually.

Recommendation 3: Update FMSS OEP guidance to reflect how managers will account for staff post-event when following active shooter guidance to not assemble at designated rally points.

Management's Response: The IRS agreed with this recommendation. The FMSS will update guidance regarding designated rally points and for staff accountability post-emergency events.

Recommendation 4: Coordinate with the Deputy Chief of Staff to develop processes and procedures on when and how AtHoc will be used to notify staff of active shooter events and how it will be used post-event to account for staff.

Management's Response: The IRS agreed with this recommendation. The FMSS will coordinate with the Deputy Chief of Staff to address the use of AtHoc to notify staff of emergency events and how to account for staff post-event.

Recommendation 5: Update internal guidelines to require follow-up reports of active shooter drills or events (even those that are ultimately determined to have been unfounded) to assess the efficacy of all actions taken responding to the event. The information developed should be used to improve response protocols.

Management's Response: The IRS agreed with this recommendation. The FMSS will require follow-up reports of active shooter events or drills to assess the efficacy of the actions taken to respond to them. The information developed can/will be used to improve response protocols.

Appendix I

Detailed Objective, Scope, and Methodology

This review was initiated because the IRS is entrusted with providing a safe and secure environment for essential functions and assets, including the personnel and public who may occupy or conduct business at its facilities. As such, IRS leaders must prepare for emergencies, especially those that can occur without warning. The overall objective of this evaluation was to determine whether IRS employees are trained on best practices to keep themselves safe during an active shooter/active threat situation. As an active shooter or other mass casualty event at a Tax Processing Center or any IRS facility could result in significant damage to the facility and even greater trauma to the staff. To accomplish our objective, we:

- Reviewed the ISC Planning and Response to an Active Shooter (Policy and Best Practice Guide 2021 Edition) for required training and recommendations, and the ISC Occupant Emergency Programs (An Interagency Security Committee Guide March 2013) for standardized procedures that agencies should consider to formulate and implement to develop effective Occupant Emergency Programs. Additionally, we reviewed Federal Bureau of Investigations material on the increases in active shooter events between 2017 and 2021.
- Determined if the FMSS provided IRS staff training as per the ISC and any additional training or training in other forms and from other sources.
- Obtained Situation Awareness Management Center data specific to active shooter incidents from January 1, 2020, to September 30, 2022, to evaluate how the information is used to assess risk and identify policies and procedures that can be improved.
- Assessed IRS processes and procedures to ensure that the OEP is current with the most up-to-date active shooter instructions and is available to IRS employees.
- Evaluated whether the IRS has taken appropriate steps to alert employees about emergency situations, such as an active shooter.

Performance of This Review

This review was performed with information obtained from the FMSS Office located in Washington, D.C. We conducted this evaluation in accordance with the Council of the Inspectors General for Integrity and Efficiency Quality Standards for Inspection and Evaluation during the period September through December 2022.

Major contributors to the report were Nancy LaManna, Assistant Inspector General for Audit, and Kevin Riley, Director.

Validity and Reliability of Data From Computer-Based Systems

We obtained the ITMS Summary Report of employees and contractors who completed FMSS Physical Security Briefing (#31659) for the period July 1, 2021, to June 30, 2022. We evaluated the reliability of the data by:

- Comparing total employee counts to IRS payroll records for reasonableness.

- Reviewing existing information about the data and the system that produced them.
- Interviewing agency officials knowledgeable about the data.

We determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for purposes of this report.

Appendix II

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

Appendix III

Management's Response to the Draft Report



CHIEF
FACILITIES MANAGEMENT AND
SECURITY SERVICES

DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY
INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE
WASHINGTON, DC 20224

April 12, 2023

MEMORANDUM FOR RUSSELL P. MARTIN
DEPUTY INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR
INSPECTIONS AND EVALUATIONS

FROM: Richard L. Rodriguez 
Chief, Facilities Management & Security Services

SUBJECT: Draft Audit Report – Assessment of the Internal Revenue
Service's Active Shooter Readiness and Training (Evaluation
#IE-22-016)

Thank you for the opportunity to review and comment on the draft audit report. We appreciate your report acknowledging the IRS developed an active shooter training program that educates employees on the "Run, Hide, Fight" response that aligns with the Department of Homeland Security guidelines for dealing with an active shooter situation. This training is given to IRS employees and contractors to provide comprehensive information on IRS security policies, procedures, and actions that should be taken to prepare for and respond to potential security incidents and emergencies.

IRS Facilities Management and Security Services (FMSS) is committed to the safety and security of our facilities and the employees and taxpayer information they contain. Your recommendations will assist us in our efforts to enhance our emergency preparedness.

We agree with each of the recommendations. We have developed corrective actions to remediate the report findings and have already begun making progress on multiple recommendations. Specifically, we implemented a formalized process to remove access for contractor employees who failed to timely complete training requirements, addressing Recommendation #1. Additionally, in response to Recommendation #2, we updated the FMSS Physical Security briefing to include a reminder for employees to discuss emergency preparedness with their managers.

Lastly, to address Recommendations 3 through 5, we are in the process of forming an Active Shooter Working Group (ASWG) with representation from FMSS Security, the Senior Commissioner's Representative-Continuity Operations office, and Campus Site Coordinators. The ASWG will coordinate to develop and implement updated guidelines for pre-incident planning and response to emergency events including active shooter

incidents/drills, changes to IRS Occupant Emergency Plans, and procedures detailing when and how to notify staff using the Emergency Alert Notification System.

Attached is our corrective action plan describing how we addressed/plan to address your recommendations.

We appreciate the continued support and assistance provided by your office. If you have any questions, please contact me at 202-317-4480, or a member of your staff may contact Brian Soloman, associate director, Security, Facilities Management and Security Services at 231-493-8977.

Attachment

Attachment

TIGTA RECOMMENDATION #1:

The Chief, FMSS should ensure that contractors are denied access to IRS buildings if they fail to complete the assigned FMSS Physical Security Mandatory Briefing timely.

CORRECTIVE ACTION #1:

We agree with this recommendation and consider it closed. On December 13, 2022, FMSS implemented a formalized process to remove access to IRS facilities for contractor employees who fail to timely complete contractor training requirements including the FMSS Physical Security Mandatory Briefing.

IMPLEMENTATION DATE:

Implemented December 13, 2022.

RESPONSIBLE OFFICIAL:

Chief, Facilities Management and Security Services

TIGTA RECOMMENDATION #2:

The Chief, FMSS, should update the annual FMSS Physical Security Briefing to emphasize that employees need to discuss emergency preparedness with their managers annually to ensure that they are clear on evacuation routes, shelter-in-place locations, and when gathering at rally points is appropriate.

CORRECTIVE ACTION #2:

We agree with this recommendation and consider it closed. On March 22, 2023, FMSS updated the annual FMSS Physical Security Briefing to emphasize that employees need to discuss emergency preparedness with their managers annually to ensure that they are clear on evacuation routes, shelter-in-place locations, and when gathering at rally points is appropriate.

IMPLEMENTATION DATE:

Implemented March 22, 2023.

RESPONSIBLE OFFICIAL:

Chief, Facilities Management and Security Services

TIGTA RECOMMENDATION #3:

The Chief, FMSS, should update FMSS OEP guidance to reflect how managers will account for staff post-event when following active shooter guidance to not assemble at designated rally points.

CORRECTIVE ACTION #3:

We agree with this recommendation. By August 15, 2024, FMSS will update guidance regarding designated rally points and for staff accountability post-emergency events.

IMPLEMENTATION DATE:

August 15, 2024

RESPONSIBLE OFFICIAL:

Chief, Facilities Management and Security Services

TIGTA RECOMMENDATION #4:

The Chief, FMSS, should coordinate with the Deputy Chief of Staff to develop processes and procedures on when and how AtHoc will be used to notify staff of active shooter events and how it will be used post-event to account for staff.

CORRECTIVE ACTION #4:

We agree with this recommendation. By August 15, 2024, FMSS will coordinate with the Deputy Chief of Staff to develop processes and procedures on when and how AtHoc can/will be used to notify staff of emergency events and how it can/will be used post-event to account for staff.

IMPLEMENTATION DATE:

August 15, 2024

RESPONSIBLE OFFICIAL:

Chief, Facilities Management and Security Services

TIGTA RECOMMENDATION #5:

The Chief, FMSS, should update internal guidelines to require follow-up reports of active shooter drills or events (even those that are ultimately determined to have been unfounded) to assess the efficacy of all actions taken responding to the event. The information developed should be used to improve response protocols.

CORRECTIVE ACTION #5:

We agree with this recommendation. By August 15, 2024, FMSS will update internal guidelines to require follow-up reports of active shooter drills or events to assess the efficacy of all actions taken responding to the drill or event. The information developed can/will be used to improve response protocols.

IMPLEMENTATION DATE:

August 15, 2024

RESPONSIBLE OFFICIAL:

Chief, Facilities Management and Security Services

CORRECTIVE ACTION MONITORING PLAN:

Corrective actions are entered into the Joint Audit Management Enterprise System (JAMES) and are monitored monthly through completion.

Appendix IV

Abbreviations

FMSS	Facilities Management and Security Services
IRS	Internal Revenue Service
ISC	Interagency Security Committee
ITMS	Integrated Talent Management System
OEP	Occupant Emergency Plan



**To report fraud, waste, or abuse,
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Washington, D.C. 20026

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